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ABSTRACT 
 
EMILY LEONARD PARKS: What holds your attention? The neural effects of memory on 
attention 
(Under the direction of Joseph Hopfinger) 
 
The allocation of attention, including the initial orienting and the subsequent dwell-
time, is affected by several bottom-up and top-down factors. How item-memory affects these 
processes, however, remains unclear. In four behavioral experiments, we investigated 
whether item-memory affects attentional dwell time by using a modified version of the 
attentional blink (AB) paradigm. Our results revealed that the AB was significantly affected 
by memory-status (novel versus old), but critically this effect depended on the ongoing 
memory context (Parks & Hopfinger, 2008). To directly examine the neural effects of 
memory and memory context on attentional allocation, we recorded event-related potentials 
(ERPs) while subjects performed a modified cuing paradigm. Our results revealed that 
memory significantly affects target processing at both early and late stages of analysis. 
Specifically, targets following memorially unique, “old” (previously studied) cues showed 
increased visual processing and faster reaction times compared to targets following non-
unique cues. These data provide new evidence that memory affects attention at the neural 
level, and that this effect occurs at early visual processing levels (as indexed by the P1) and 
at higher order stages of processing (as indexed by the P300).   
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CHAPTER 1 
PART 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
 The allocation of attention is affected by several factors, including bottom-up, 
reflexive capture toward stimuli that are highly salient in their physical features, and top-
down voluntary orienting toward task relevant stimuli (Berger, Henik, & Rafal, 2005; Cheal 
& Lyon, 1991; Hopfinger & West, 2006; Jonides, 1981; Müller & Rabbitt, 1989; Posner & 
Cohen, 1984). More recent work has highlighted the effects of higher-order factors on 
attention, such as orienting toward the location of another person’s gaze, toward emotional 
stimuli, and toward items being actively held in working memory (de Fockert, Rees, Frith, & 
Lavie, 2001; Fox, Russo, Bowles, & Dutton, 2001; Langton & Bruce, 1999; Ohman, Flykt, & 
Esteves, 2001; Smith, Most, Newsome, & Zald, 2006). The role of memory in the allocation 
of attention, however, remains unclear. Previous studies have shown that memory affects the 
initial capture of attention, although the results have been inconsistent regarding if it is the 
old or new item that captures attention. For example, some studies have found evidence for 
attentional capture to a novel word compared to previously studied words (Johnston, Hawley, 
Plewe, Elliott, & DeWitt, 1990; Wang, Cavanagh, & Green, 1994), whereas others have 
found evidence that a familiar word captures attention relative to a novel non-word (Christie 
& Klein, 1995). Despite different experimental paradigms and stimuli, and a different pattern 
of results, these previous studies suggest that item-memory does influence the initial capture 
or attraction of attention. In addition, recent evidence suggests that item-memory not only 
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affects this initial capture of attention, but also affects how long attention dwells or is held by 
an item. Exploring both of these mechanisms (the initial capture and the later hold of 
attention) provides a more comprehensive understanding of memory’s effects on attention. 
Indeed, the holding of attention may be even more important than the initial orienting in 
affecting cognition and subsequent actions. Using eye-tracking as a means to examine both 
attentional capture and attentional hold, Chanon & Hopfinger (2008) recently found that 
fixations during scene-viewing were more frequent, and critically, lasted for a longer 
duration on “old” (previously studied) items versus “new” (never before seen) items. These 
results were found regardless of self-reported strategies, suggesting that item-memory may 
have an involuntary effect on attentional dwell time.  
In the previous eye-tracking study, however, there was no immediate cost to dwelling 
longer on an item, and therefore it’s unclear how strong or automatic this effect may be. To 
address this issue, Parks & Hopfinger (2008) utilized a different, well-established method for 
quantifying the temporal allocation of attention: the “attentional blink” (AB) paradigm. In 
this paradigm, there is a significant cost for increasingly long dwell times on the initial target, 
and therefore the automaticity of the effects of memory on attention can be measured. The 
AB refers to the finding that the correct identification of one target in a rapid serial visual 
presentation (RSVP) stream causes a marked impairment for detecting a second target (T2) 
presented shortly (~200-500 ms) after the onset of the first target (T1) (Broadbent & 
Broadbent, 1987; Chun & Potter, 1995; Raymond, Shapiro, & Arnell, 1992). Evidence 
suggests this effect occurs at a postperceptual phase of T2 processing (Giesbrecht & Di Lollo, 
1998; Vogel & Luck, 2002; Vogel, Luck, & Shapiro, 1998). One theory has proposed that, as 
limited attentional resources are absorbed in T1 processing, the consolidation of T2 i
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memory is prevented (Chun & Potter, 1995). Further support for this theory comes from 
electrophysiological work finding that the T2-elicited P300, an ERP component related to the 
context updating of working memory, is suppressed during the AB, while earlier perceptual-
based components are not (Vogel & Luck, 1998). Thus, according to this view, the T2 is 
perceived during the AB, but it cannot be fully consolidated and thus reported (Jolicoeur & 
Dell’Acqua, 2000). Therefore, although the AB is caused by the presence of T1, it is at T2 
where the blink’s measurable effects are manifested. Thus, the blink provides an excellent 
tool for measuring the effects of memory on attention. Of particular interest here was 
whether or not individual item-memory would influence the degree of attentional holding on 
that item. Specifically, using a modified AB paradigm, we manipulated the memory-status of 
the first target (T1) (while keeping the distracters “old”) to investigate whether the presence 
and duration of the blink differs when old versus new items are the T1 (referred to here as 
Experiment 1). Before the experimental phase, participants performed an encoding task in 
which they had to make semantic judgments about a set of pictures in order to produce strong, 
robust memory traces (thus, creating a set of “old”, previously studied, items for the AB 
phase) (c.f., Craik & Tulving, 1975). Following the encoding phase, participants performed 
the AB task described above. The experiment followed a typical procedure utilized in AB 
studies in which participants identified both T1 and T2 at the end of each trial (Chun & 
Potter, 1995; Giesbrecht & Di Lillo, 1998; Keil & Ihssen, 2004; Olson, Chun, & Anderson, 
2001; Olivers & Nieuwenhuis, 2006; Raymond et al, 1992). A total of 240 sequences were 
presented, with 40 trials of each combination of memory-status and lag. 
Critically, the results revealed new evidence that the memory-status of an item 
significantly affects the temporal allocation of attention, as the AB was extended when T1 
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was a “new item” (not seen previously in the experiment) as compared to an “old item” 
(previously studied). This delay in the recovery of the AB demonstrates that the attentional 
dwell time on T1 was significantly lengthened when T1 was a “new” item versus an “old” 
item. These results suggest that memory plays a significant role in the duration and temporal 
allocation of attention; specifically, that novel items increased the length of attentional hold, 
as compared to familiar items (Parks & Hopfinger, 2008; See Figure 1 below).  
 
FIGURE 1: T2 Accuracy (Experiment 1) 
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SOA = stimulus onset asynchrony between T1 and T2  
* denotes significance after B-H correction for multiple comparisons (Benjamini & Hochberg, 1995). 
 
Although a robust effect was found suggesting that novel items hold attention, it is 
possible that this effect was at least partially due to two additional factors: the task utilized 
and the memory-status of the distractor stream (the non-target stimuli). In regards to the task 
(to identify T1 and T2 by name), the extended hold found for new items may have been 
related to differences in the time required to generate names for “old” versus “new” items. 
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Previously, it has been shown that the naming of an item is improved by prior experience 
with that item (e.g., Tulving & Schacter, 1990). In regards to Experiment 1, participants may 
have displayed a larger and prolonged AB because more time was required to generate a 
name for a new T1 as compared to an old T1. To remove this potential confound, we 
proposed a follow-up study (Experiment 2) in which the item pictures previously used as 
stimuli in Experiment 1 were replaced with abstract line-drawings. These abstract line-
drawings were designed to minimize verbal processing; thus, reducing any possible effects 
resulting from differences in the time to generate names for old versus new items. This 
manipulation in stimuli led to several critical changes in the original experiment, including 
the timing and the task used. Specifically, because these abstract stimuli are more difficult to 
process, both the duration of the stimuli and the interstimulus interval between them was 
increased. In addition, the identification task previously utilized was replaced by a task that 
was not dependent on the naming of items (See Methods section for further details.). Overall, 
the goal of Experiment 2 was to replicate the findings of Experiment 1 (longer AB following 
new items, when context is old) using stimuli designed to limit verbal processing, thus ruling 
out the possibility of task effects.  
In addition to the task effects, an important remaining issue lay in determining the 
quality of the novel item that led to its increased hold on attention. The results of Experiment 
1 (and later Experiment 2) suggest that new items may hold attention longer because they’ve 
never been viewed before. However, the new items also had a unique memory-status relative 
to the ongoing context, as all the distractors were old. Recent work has supported this notion 
that it is not necessarily the item-memory strength per se, but rather its memorial uniqueness 
(relative to current context) that affects attentional allocation. For example, Diliberto, 
6 
 
Altarriba, & Neill investigated the initial orienting of attention and found that attention was 
involuntarily captured by the one word out of four simultaneously presented words that was 
unique in its memory (novel vs. familiar) (2000). While that study showed the importance of 
uniqueness in the initial capture of attention, attentional dwell time and memory context 
across time were not investigated.  
Evidence that memorial uniqueness affects attention has also come from eye-tracking 
studies. For example, Ryan, Althoff, Whithlow, & Cohen (2000) investigated the influence 
of relational memory (memory between items) on attention. Participants viewed familiar 
scenes in which one region of the scene was manipulated (e.g., insertion of an item). These 
manipulations within old scenes increased attentional allocation to the one location that was 
“new” (i.e., modified), demonstrating the impact of relational memory on attention, but also 
demonstrating the effect of memorial uniqueness on attention. Additionally, the eye-tracking 
study by Chanon and Hopfinger mentioned previously also demonstrated the influence of 
item-memory and context on attention (2008). This study demonstrated that when viewing 
“new” scenes, participants looked more often and for longer durations at “old” items 
compared to “new” items. Again, it was the memorially unique item that captured and held 
attention. Overall, both of these eye-tracking studies support the idea that the effects of 
memory on attention are influenced by the interaction of item-memory and memory context. 
The results of Experiment 1 originally suggested that new items may hold attention 
longer because they’ve never been viewed before (assuming that the effects of naming 
differences are removed by Experiment 2). In other words, the observed effect was attributed 
to the individual memory-status of T1. However, in that paradigm, the new item also had a 
unique memory-status relative to the ongoing context, as all the distractors were old. Based 
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on the literature described above, the finding that the new item led to its increased hold on 
attention may not be due to the novelty of T1, but instead may be linked to T1’s individual 
memory-status compared to that of the distractors. To test whether it was the newness of the 
item or the memorial uniqueness that caused the protracted AB, we conducted an additional 
experiment (Experiment 3) in which the memory context was reversed by using new items as 
distractors instead of old items. Thus, “old” T1s were unique relative to ongoing context, 
contrary to Experiments 1 and 2, where “new” items were unique. If the attentional effects 
observed in Experiments 1 and 2 were solely due to the “newness” of T1, then the memorial 
context should not matter, and new items should again produce a protracted AB. However, if 
these effects are dependent on the memorial context, then Experiment 3 should display 
opposite results from Experiments 1 and 2 – specifically, old T1’s (among new distractors) 
should cause a longer AB as compared to new T1’s.  
If Experiment 3 finds that the AB is extended when T1 is memorially unique, this will 
provide additional evidence that memorial uniqueness significantly affects attention. 
However, the possibility would still exist that the effect could be driven by the relation 
between T1 and T2 (i.e. memory priming), as opposed to the relation between T1 and the 
distractors (i.e., memory context).  Recent work has demonstrated that T2 performance is 
worse when T1 and T2 come from different categories (e.g. letter vs. digit) compared to 
when both come from the same category (collapsed across type of distractor category) (Juola, 
Botella, & Palacios, 2004). To test whether our effects are driven by the ongoing memorial 
context set up by the distracters (as will be demonstrated in Experiment 3) or by a mismatch 
between T1 and T2, we conducted Experiment 4. This experiment was similar to Experiment 
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2 (wherein distractors and T2 were always “new”), except that here T2 was always “old,” 
and thus never matched the distractors.  
 
Thus, the specifics goals of Part 1 were as follows: 
I. To reduce possible effects resulting from differences in the time required to 
generate names for “old” versus “new” items through the use of abstract line-
drawings that minimize verbal processing (Experiment 2). 
II. To determine whether the effects of item-memory on attentional allocation 
were based on an item’s memorial strength per se, or rather, are based on an 
item’s memorial uniqueness relative to current context (Experiment 3). 
III. To rule out the possibility that the relationship between T1 and T2 (through 
memorial priming effects) was driving the results of Experiments 1-3, as 
opposed to the relationship between T1 and the distractors (through memorial 
context effects) (Experiment 4). 
These goals were accomplished through Experiments 2, 3, and 4. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 2 
PART 2: INTRODUCTION 
Part 1 of this study utilized behavioral methods to investigate the effects of memory 
and particularly memory context on attention, finding that (as is later discussed) items unique 
in memory held attention longer than memorially non-unique items. However, much remains 
unclear concerning the neural underpinnings of this effect. While a great deal of 
electrophysiological work has been conducted on the cognitive systems of memory and 
attention individually, little is known concerning their interaction within the brain. 
Classically, memory and attention have each been studied at the neural level through the use 
of varying paradigms. For example, one means of studying recognition memory has been to 
examine the ERPs elicited by correctly classified old (previously studied) items as compared 
to correctly classified new (never before seen) items. Further, attention has been studied 
through cuing paradigms in which a cue (an arrow pointing left or right) voluntarily orients 
one’s attention to a spatial location where a target may appear, leading to early visual 
processing enhancements to targets at that peripheral location (Mangun & Hillyard, 1991). 
However, of particular interest here is the neural activities related to the influence of memory 
and memory-context on attention, which to our knowledge has never been investigated. In 
order to examine this relationship, we proposed the use of a new paradigm, that combines the 
two paradigms described above, which are typically utilized to study memory and attention 
individually. We chose not to use the AB paradigm in conjunction with ERPs for several 
reasons. First, the rapid presentation of stimuli required for the AB paradigm leads to overlap 
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in the evoked potentials of the stimuli presented within the stream. Typically, this overlap 
can be removed through the use of a variable stimulus presentation; however, such a 
manipulation can change the inherent nature of the blink, and therefore, is not appropriate. 
While some studies have attempted to isolate T2 through the use of “blank” trials (T2s 
specifically) (Sergent, et al, 2005), no paradigm has been developed to isolate the ERPs to T1, 
the stimulus of interest here. In addition to this methodological difficulty, we were interested 
in memory-related ERPs which occur much later in time. Using the RSVP necessary for the 
AB paradigm, multiple stimuli would have been presented by the time that a memory-related 
component was evoked, and it would be impossible to distinguish which of many stimuli had 
produced a particular neural effect. Based on these limitations related to stimulus overlap 
problems, we chose to use a more standard attentional paradigm that has been commonly 
used to study attention through the use of ERPs (both in and outside our lab). Specifically, 
the voluntary arrow cue used in the cuing paradigm (described above) was replaced with 
pictures of items which vary in their memory-status. Therefore, peripheral targets were 
preceded not by a cue directly orienting attention, but rather by an old (previously studied) or 
new (never before seen) picture, now referred to as a “memory cue.” This memory cue was 
not predictive of the target location, but allowed us to examine how memory-status affects 
attention, as indexed through the neural processing of targets which follow old or new 
memory cues. Because we were interested not only in the effects of memory-status, but also 
in those of memory context on attention, we also manipulated the probability of old and new 
items.  Specifically, we compared the neural processing of targets following old memorially 
unique cues to that of targets following memorially non-unique cues. Before discussing 
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further details of this new paradigm, it is first necessary to provide further background 
regarding the ERP components affected by memory and by attention.   
Again, because we are most interested in the effect of memory on the temporal 
allocation of attention, we proposed the use of event-related potentials (ERPs), which provide 
excellent temporal resolution. ERPs reflect voltage changes on the scalp that allow for a 
measurement of the processing of an event (i.e. a stimulus). They are represented as 
waveforms of positivities and negativities (peaks and troughs) whose averages reflect the 
temporal progression of the neural processing related to that event. Each of these peaks or 
troughs is considered to be an ERP component, defined by its polarity and temporal position 
within the ERP waveform. Many of these ERP components have been linked to specific 
functional processing through the evaluation of their amplitudes and latencies. 
 Of particular interest here was how memory’s affect on attention influences stimulus 
processing, whether it be at early visual processing levels or at later higher order levels. 
Before evaluating the influence of this interaction, it is important to first understand how 
these two cognitive systems (memory and attention) individually affect stimulus processing. 
Our discussion will begin with the ERP effects of memory. 
 
Memory-related ERP Effects 
Different types of memory have been found to have distinct ERP correlates. Critical 
to this study is the identification of separate ERP components related to the processing of 
memory-status and the processing of memory context, respectively.  In regards to memory-
status, numerous ERP studies have revealed a pattern known as the parietal “old/new effect,” 
in which correctly-judged studied items elicit more positive ERPs compared to correctly-
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judged new items. This positive shift is maximal over the left parietal scalp between 500 and 
800ms after stimulus onset and is traditionally suggested to be sensitive to, or reflect some 
aspect, of, recollection-driven recognition (Wilding & Rugg, 1996; Smith; 1993); the parietal 
old/new effect is not associated with the P300 component (Herron, Quayle, & Rugg, 2003). 
Additionally, the parietal old/new effect has been further characterized through the use of 
functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), finding that studied items (as compared to 
new items) are associated with an increased neural response within several regions most 
consistently including: the inferior and superior parietal cortex, medial parietal cortex, 
posterior cingulated cortex, and prefrontal areas such as the bilateral anterior, right 
dorsolateral, and left ventrolateral cortex (Rugg & Henson, 2002; Herron, Henson, & Rugg, 
2004). The anatomical overlap between the neural circuits engaged in the parietal old/new 
effect and those involved in attentional processing provide some of the first evidence for a 
functional link between memory and attention. 
In addition to the parietal old/new effect, recent research has identified additional 
memory-related components which are dependent not on individual item-memory, but rather 
on the memorial context established between an item and the items surrounding it. By 
manipulating the ratio of old and new items in a test phase, the effects of memorial context 
can be investigated. Using ERP designs, it has been found that varying the old:new ratio (and 
thus the memory context) had no effect on the amplitude or the scalp distribution of the 
parietal old/new effect, despite informing the participants of this manipulation (Herron et al, 
2003; Friedman & Johnson, 2000; Rugg & Allan, 2000). Based on the notion that the parietal 
old/new effect reflects recollection-driven recognition, this dissociation was considered 
evidence that the parietal old/new effect solely related to memory retrieval can be separated 
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from those related to other processes (i.e. detection of memorial uniqueness). Critically, this 
manipulation of the probability of old to new items led to the discovery of two distinct ERP 
components related to memory context. Specifically, Herron and colleagues (2003) found a 
late component (~800-1100ms) that demonstrated a greater positivity for low probability 
items (nouns that were memorially unique) than for items of either equal or high probability. 
This effect was more prominent for old items, however the scalp distribution of this 
“probability” or “context” effect (maximal over the midline and right posterior scalp) was 
significantly different from that of the parietal old/new effect, suggesting that these two 
components arise from at least partially distinct neural generators. In addition, both the time 
course and the topography of the context effect were found to be distinct from that of the 
P300. Overall, this study provided new evidence that the parietal old/new effect traditionally 
associated with successful episodic retrieval can be dissociated from a second, later 
component related to variables such as probability, or memorial context. Again, such 
findings suggest that these two components may reflect differing neural generators (Herron et 
al, 2003).  
In order to localize these neural generators, Herron and colleagues employed the 
same paradigm mentioned above utilizing an event-related fMRI design. As expected, it was 
found that old/new effects within certain regions were not affected by variations in the 
old:new ratio, while other regions were strongly influenced by this manipulation. Specifically, 
greater activity was found in the bilateral inferior and medial parietal cortex, and the 
posterior cingulate by correctly judged old (as compared to new) items, regardless of the 
old:new ratio. In contrast, activity within the superior parietal cortex and several prefrontal 
areas (anterior, dorsolateral, and ventrolateral prefrontal cortex) depended on the old:new 
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ratio. Again, these data support a distinction between the parietal old/new effect and the 
memory context effects. Upon these findings, further analysis was conducted on the original 
ERP data of Herron and colleagues (2003), leading to the discovery of a second context-
dependent ERP component. Specifically, around 1200ms after stimulus onset, a negative 
shift over frontal electrodes was found for memorially unique items, but not during equal 
probability conditions. 
To summarize, distinct sets of memory-related ERP components have been identified: 
one reflecting recollection-driven recognition (parietal old/new effect) and two reflecting 
memorial context (late components identified by Herron et al). All of these components have 
been identified in paradigms employing a test phase involving the slow presentation of 
individual items. To our knowledge, no previous studies have investigated how these 
memory components are affected by the presence of an additional stimulus following the 
memory cue that does not vary in terms of its memory-status (i.e. a peripheral target). 
Although these memory effects are of interest, we are more primarily concerned with 
memory’s affect on attentional processing. However, before discussing this topic, we must 
again first describe typical ERP effects found to be modulated solely by attention. 
 
Attention-related ERP Effects 
Many previous studies have demonstrated that voluntary attention influences stimulus 
processing at both early and late stages of analysis. Items which are voluntarily attended to, 
as compared to items that are unattended, have enhanced early visual processing as indexed 
by increased amplitudes in two extrastriate-generated components: the P1 (in discrimination 
and localization tasks) and the N1 (in discrimination tasks) (Heinze, Mangun, Burchert, 
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Hinrichs, Scholz, & Munte, 1994; Mangun, Hopfinger, Kussmaul, Fletcher, & Heinze, 1997; 
Hopfinger & Mangun, 1998; Mangun & Hillyard, 1991; Vogel & Luck, 2000). The P1 is a 
positive deflection peaking 80-130ms post stimulus onset and generated in the occipital 
cortex, and the N1 is a negative deflection composed of several subcomponents that peak 
100-200ms post-stimulus. Appearing after these early sensory-driven components is a later 
component appearing 250-500ms post-stimulus, which has also been found to be modulated 
by attention. This higher order component, known as the P300, is interpreted as reflecting the 
contextual updating of working memory (Donchin & Coles, 1988). The latency of the P300 
is influenced by the level of difficulty that is required to categorize two or more stimuli types 
and is considered to reflect stimulus evaluation time (Donchin & Coles, 1988). The 
amplitude of the P300 is modulated by the probability of a stimulus type. More specifically, 
rare items increase the amplitude of the P300, as compared to common items (Donchin & 
Coles, 1988). The amplitude of the P300 is also reduced for unattended stimuli (Mangun & 
Hillyard, 1995). In summary, by examining which ERP components are influenced by 
attention, the level of attention’s effect on that stimulus processing can be determined. 
Modulations of the P1 and N1 reflect early effects on visual processing, while modulations of 
the P300 reflect later higher-order stimulus processing effects. 
In summary, attention has been found to affect both early visual processing (i.e. the 
P1 and the N1) and later categorization processing (i.e. the P300) of visual stimuli. To our 
knowledge, no previous studies have investigated how attention (as seen through 
modulations of the P1, N1, and P300 to targets) is affected by memory at the neural level. 
Therefore, the goal of the current study was to examine the neural effects of memory and 
memory context on attention through the use of ERPs. First, a pilot behavioral study 
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(Experiment 5) was conducted to determine the stimulus presentation rate (more specifically, 
the optimal stimulus onset asynchrony between stimuli) in which the effects of memory on 
attention are largest. Then, the resulting stimulus rate was utilized in the design of 
Experiment 6. Importantly, Experiment 6 employed event-related potentials in order to 
examine the neural effects of memory on attention.   
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 3 
PART 1: METHODS & RESULTS 
 
Experiment 2 
Experiment 1 revealed new evidence that the memory-status of an item affects 
attentional dwell time; specifically, that the AB is extended when T1 was a “new” item as 
compared to an “old” item. The goal of Experiment 2 was to minimize any potential effects 
seen in Experiment 1 related to differences in the time required to generate names for “old” 
versus “new” items. This was accomplished through the use of abstract line-drawings which 
were designed to limit verbal processing (Please see examples below). 
 
 
 
Participants 
 Seventeen undergraduates, ages 18-20 (13 female) and with 20/20 or corrected to 
20/20 vision, from the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill participated for course 
credit. 
Example Stimuli: 
Experiment 1 Experiment 2 
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Materials & Procedure  
Participants first completed three blocks of encoding. For stimuli, abstract shapes 
were extracted from a set of line-drawings designed by Slotnick and Schacter (2004) to limit 
verbal processing. Participants were instructed to study each line-drawing (average size 7.9° 
x 7.9°) in preparation for a later memory test. The stimuli were presented one at a time, and 
each block was self-paced. Thirty-six objects were studied; thirty of which were used in the 
subsequent AB trials (the same thirty for all subjects).  
The AB trials were similar to Experiment 1, but with a few differences related to the 
change in stimuli. Like Experiment 1, new items were considered memorially unique among 
old distractors. Unlike Experiment 1, the stimuli used were not line-drawings of common 
items, but were instead abstract line-drawings with colored internal lines. The non-target 
stimuli were all old (previously studied) pictures, with a black background; T1 and T2 had 
gray backgrounds. T1 was equally likely to be an old or new item, and it appeared randomly 
at serial position 4 or 5. T2 consisted of only old items, and it randomly appeared 1, 2, or 3 
positions after T1 (i.e., lag 1, 2, or 3). There were 10 items per stream, and each picture was 
displayed for 176ms with an ISI of 52ms (an increase as compared to Experiment 1 to reflect 
the increased stimulus processes difficulty of abstract items). Due to the increased duration 
and inclusion of an ISI, the lags here are not temporally equivalent to those in Experiment 1. 
Additionally, the original identification task used in Experiment 1 was no longer applicable 
and was replaced with tasks that were not dependent on naming. Specifically, at the end of 
each trial, participants made an old/new response to T1 and matched the color of T2 to a 
color on a 3x3 grid of color patches. There were 24 trials of each combination of memory-
status and lag. Following the AB task, participants completed a recognition memory test. 
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Specifically, participants were asked to judge whether or not they had studied a particular 
item during the encoding phase. 
 
Results 
A two-way ANOVA was performed on T2 accuracy with the factors of T1 memory-
status (old T1 or new T1) and lag (2, 3, or 4). Only trials in which T1 was correctly identified 
were included. For T2, the ANOVA revealed significant main effects of both memory-status 
[new: 0.585; old: 0.542; F(1,16)=11.907, p=0.003] and lag [lag 1: 0.424; lag 2: 0.593; lag 3: 
0.664; F(2,32)=17.176, p<0.001], and an interaction between memory-status and lag that 
approached significance. Paired t-tests were also conducted on T2 accuracy and were 
corrected for multiple comparisons using the Benjamini & Hochberg (B-H) correction 
procedure (1995). At Lag 1, T2 accuracy was significantly worse for “new T1” trials 
(M=0.358; SD=0.238) compared to “old T1” trials (M=0.433; SD=0.206) (t(16)=2.140, 
p=0.024). This same significant effect was present, and was even larger, at Lag 2 (“new T1” 
trials: M=0.482, SD=0.257; “old T1” trials: M=0.616, SD=0.194; t(16)=3.520, p=0.001). At 
Lag 3, there were no longer any significant differences (t(16)=1.026, p=0.160) in T2 
accuracy between “old T1” trials (M=0.668; SD=0.226), and “new T1” trials (M=0.636; 
SD=0.247). Despite the change in the stimuli and tasks, the findings of Experiment 2 
replicated the key finding of Experiment 1: the AB was extended when T1 was a “new item” 
as compared to an “old item” when the memory context was “old items” (Figure 2). 
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FIGURE 2: T2 Accuracy (Experiment 2) 
 
 
SOA = stimulus onset asynchrony between T1 and T2  
* denotes significance after B-H correction for multiple comparisons (Benjamini & Hochberg, 1995). 
 
Mean T1 accuracy was 77.9% with no significant effect of memory-status 
[F(1,16)=1.692, p=0.212]. A significant main effect of lag was found [F(2,32)=7.770, 
p=0.002], as was a significant interaction between memory-status and lag [F(2,32)=7.439, 
p=0.002]. However, paired t-tests revealed no significant differences in T1 accuracy between 
“old T1” and “new T1” at any lag. [Lag 1: t(16)=-1.89, p=0.039, not significant when 
corrected for multiple comparisons; Lag 2: t(16)=-0.410, p=0.344; Lag 3: t(16)=-1.301, 
p=0.106].  
After the AB task, participants completed a recognition memory test for single 
objects (one-fourth new; one-fourth encountered in only the encoding phase; one-fourth 
encountered in the encoding and AB phases; one-fourth encountered only during the AB 
phase). Participants were asked whether or not they had studied the item during the encoding 
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phase. Overall, participants correctly judged 90.2% of the studied items as “studied,” with no 
differences between items seen or not seen in the AB phase. [Studied Only: M=0.902 
(SD=0.196); Studied & used in AB phase: M=0.902 (SD=0.167); t(16)=0.000, p=1.000]. In 
addition, participants were highly accurate on judging items that were new as “not studied” 
(M=0.902; SD=0.166).   
 
Discussion 
The goal of this experiment was to remove any possible effects present in Experiment 
1 that may have been related to differences in the time to generate names for old versus new 
items. This was accomplished by replacing the stimuli used in the original paradigm (line-
drawings of items) with abstract stimuli designed to limit verbal processing. Despite the 
change in stimuli, the results of Experiment 2 replicated the findings of Experiment 1 (longer 
AB following new items, when context is old), suggesting that the observed findings were 
not confounded by naming effects.  
 
Experiment 3 
 The results of Experiments 1 and 2 suggest that new items may hold attention longer 
because they’ve never been viewed before. However, the new item also had a unique 
memory-status relative to the ongoing context, as all the distractors were old. To test whether 
it was the newness of the item or the memorial uniqueness that caused the protracted AB, we 
conducted a third experiment in which the memory context was reversed by using “new” 
items (never before seen) as distractors instead of old items. Thus, “old” T1s were now 
unique relative to ongoing context, contrary to Experiments 1 and 2 where “new” items were 
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unique. If the attentional effects observed in Experiments 1 and 2 were solely due to the 
“newness” of T1, then the memorial context should have no effect, and new items should 
again produce a protracted AB. However, if these effects are dependent on the memorial 
context, then Experiment 3 should display opposite results from Experiments 1 and 2 – 
specifically, old T1’s should cause a longer AB compared to new T1’s.  
 
Participants 
 Sixteen undergraduate students, ages 18-20 (10 female), from the University of North 
Carolina at Chapel Hill participated. Each participant had 20/20 or corrected to 20/20 vision 
and received course credit as compensation.  
 
Materials & Procedure 
Stimuli and procedures were the same as in Experiment 2, except that the memory-
status of the nontarget distractors and T2 was “new” instead of “old.” Therefore, “old” items 
were considered unique among “new” distractors. 
  
Results 
A two-way ANOVA and paired t-tests were conducted on T2 accuracy, as in 
Experiments 1 and 2. Only trials in which the T1 task was correctly completed were included. 
The ANOVA revealed significant main effects of both memory-status and lag. T2 accuracy 
was significantly reduced when T1 was an old item, compared to a new item [old: 0.493; 
new: 0.578 F(1,15)=12.516, p=0.003], and T2 accuracy increased with increasing lag [lag 1: 
0.464; lag 2: 0.501; lag 3: 0.626; F(2,30)=7.331, p=0.003]. Finally, there was a significant 
23 
 
interaction between memory-status and lag [F(2,30)=3.658, p=0.038]. Paired t-tests were 
again corrected for multiple comparisons using the B-H correction procedure (1995). At Lag 
1, T2 accuracy was significantly worse for “old T1” trials (M=0.399; SD=0.176) versus “new 
T1” trials (M=0.514; SD=0.154) (t(15)=-3.46, p=0.002). This difference was also significant, 
and even larger, at Lag 2 (“old T1” trials: M=0.473; SD=0.267; “new T1” trials: M=0.627; 
SD=0.150; t(15)=-3.62, p=0.001). At Lag 3, T2 accuracy was no longer different (t(15)=-
0.162, p=0.437) between “old T1” (M=0.589; SD=0.240), and “new T1” trials (M=0.597; 
SD=0.237) (Figure 3). 
 
FIGURE 3: T2 Accuracy (Experiment 3) 
 
   
 
SOA = stimulus onset asynchrony between T1 and T2  
* denotes significance after B-H correction for multiple comparisons (Benjamini & Hochberg, 1995). 
 
Mean T1 accuracy was 83.2% with a significant effect of memory-status [new: 0.872; 
old: 0.798; F(1,15)=21.152, p<0.001]. No significant main effect of lag was found [lag 1: 
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0.790; lag 2: 0.799; lag 3: 0.808; F(2,30)=0.370, p=0.694], and no interaction between 
memory-status and lag was found [F(2,30)=0.596, p=0.558]. 
In the memory test, participants correctly judged 94.8% of the studied items as 
“studied,” and the additional exposure during the AB phase made no difference [Studied 
Only: M=0.927(SD=0.149); Studied & used in AB phase: M=0.969 (SD=0.067); t(15)=-
1.000, p=0.333]. In addition, participants correctly judged 93.8% of items that were new or 
seen only during the AB phase as “not studied,” with no differences between “new” items 
(M=0.906; SD=0.211) and those seen only during the AB phase [(M=0.969; SD=0.067); 
t(15)=1.103, p=0.287)]. Thus, the initial encoding, not the subsequent exposure during the 
AB task, was the critical factor in establishing these memories. 
 
Discussion 
In direct contrast to Experiments 1 and 2, the current experiment found that the AB 
was extended when T1 was an “old item” as compared to a “new item.” Together, these data 
provide strong evidence that the effects of memory on attention here are not critically 
dependent on the particular memory-status of an item (old or new), but rather on the 
memorial uniqueness of an item relative to ongoing context. Overall, the results of 
Experiments 1, 2, and 3 provide new evidence for an aspect of attention that has not been 
well understood - the influence of item-memory on attentional allocation. Whereas previous 
work has emphasized the role of item-memory strength alone, the experiments here suggest 
that a broader view that also accounts for an item’s memorial context may be necessary.  
The findings of Experiments 1-3 suggest that memorial context is driving the effect of 
memory on attention seen here. However, these experiments do not rule out one other 
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possible explanation: perhaps the effect here is driven by the relation between T1 and T2 
(memory priming), as opposed to the relation between T1 and the distractors (i.e., memory 
context). To directly address this alternate explanation, we conducted Experiment 4 to test 
whether our effects are driven by the ongoing memorial context set up by the distracters or 
by a mismatch between the memory-status of T1 and T2.  
 
 
Experiment 4 
This experiment was identical to Experiment 3 (wherein distractors and T2 were 
always “new”), except that here T2 was always “old,” and thus never matched the distractors.  
If the attentional effects observed in Experiments 1-3 were due to the memory context of the 
distractor stream, then in the present experiment, “old T1’s” (being memorially unique 
relative to the distractors) should produce a protracted AB even though they match the 
memory-status of T2 (“old” T1; “old” T2). However, if our previous effects are dependent on 
the memorial similarity between T1 and T2, then a longer blink should be produced here 
when T1 and T2 do not match (“new” T1; “old” T2).  
 
Participants 
 Twenty-four undergraduate students, ages 18-20 (17 female), from the University of 
North Carolina were recruited. One participant was excluded due to an apparent lack of 
encoding of the studied items (performance was at chance for identifying studied items as 
“old” and near chance for identifying unstudied items as “new”). Each participant had 20/20 
or corrected to 20/20 vision and received course credit as compensation.  
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Materials & Procedure 
Stimuli and procedures were the same as in Experiment 3 (e.g., “new” distractors), 
except that the memory-status of T2 was always “old.”  
 
Results & Discussion 
A two-way ANOVA and paired t-tests were conducted on T2 accuracy (for trials 
wherein T1 was correctly identified). No main effect of memory-status was found new: 
0.579; old: 0.550; F(1,22)=1.870, p=0.185, but there was a significant main effect of lag [lag 
1: 0.510; lag 2: 0.571; lag 3: 0.613; F(2,44)=6.412, p=0.004], and the interaction between 
memory-status and lag approached significance [F(2,44)=2.503, p=0.093]. Paired t-tests 
were again corrected for multiple comparisons using the B-H correction procedure. At Lag 1, 
there was no difference between T2 accuracy for “old T1” trials (M=0.517; SD=0.156) 
versus “new T1” trials (M=0.504; SD=0.194) (t(22)=0.415, p=0.341). However, there was a 
significant difference between “old” and “new” T1 trials at Lag 2 (“old T1” trials: M=0.527; 
SD=0.173; “new T1” trials: M=0.615; SD=0.149; t(22)=-2.23, p=0.018). At Lag 3, T2 
accuracy was no longer different (t(22)=-0.397, p=0.348) between “old T1” (M=0.607; 
SD=0.144), and “new T1” trials (M=0.620; SD=0.127). Overall, an extended blink was 
found when T1 was “old” among “new” distractors, despite the fact that “old” T1 stimuli 
matched the memory-status of the T2 stimuli (i.e., “old”). If the observed effects had been 
due to the relationship between T1 and T2, then “new T1’s” (being memorially different 
from “old T2’s”) should have produced a longer blink. However, memorially unique targets 
(“old T1’s”) led to a protracted blink here, providing further evidence that the effects 
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observed in the present set of experiments are driven by memory context (the relationship 
between T1 and the distractors) and not by memory priming between T1 and T2 (the 
relationship between T1 and T2) (Figure 4). 
 
FIGURE 4: T2 Accuracy (Experiment 4)  
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SOA = stimulus onset asynchrony between T1 and T2  
* denotes significance after B-H correction for multiple comparisons (Benjamini & Hochberg, 1995). 
 
Mean T1 accuracy was 78.8% with a significant effect of memory-status [new: 0.837; 
old: 0.738; F(1,22)=12.847, p=0.002]. No significant main effect of lag was found [lag 1: 
0.796; lag 2: 0.770; lag 3: 0.798; F(2,44)=1.747, p=0.186, n.s.]. A significant interaction 
between memory-status and lag was found [F(2,44)=14.664, p<0.001]; however, this 
interaction on T1 responses does not seem related to the T2 effect, since paired t-tests 
revealed that this interaction on T1 responses was driven by the lack of an effect at lag 1 
trials ( old T1”: M=0.798; SD=0.116; “new T1”: M=0.794; SD=0.154; t(22)=0.149, p=0.441), 
   * 
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whereas the memory context effect on T2 responses occurred at a different lag (i.e. on lag 2 
trials).   
For the recognition memory test, participants correctly judged 95.3% of the studied 
items as “studied,” and the additional exposure during the AB phase made no difference 
[Studied Only: M=0.927(SD=0.131); Studied & used in AB phase: M=0.978 (SD=0.057); 
t(22)=-2.07, p=0.024, n.s. with B-H correction]. In addition, participants correctly judged 
91.3% of items that were new or seen only during the AB phase as “not studied,” with no 
differences between “new” items (M=0.913; SD=0.132) and those seen only during the AB 
phase [(M=0.902; SD=0.206); t(22)=0.157, p=0.438)].  
 
Overall, the goals of Part 1 were accomplished: 
I. Experiment 2 replicated the key finding of Experiment 1, finding that the AB was 
extended when T1 was a “new item” as compared to an “old item” (when the 
memory context was “old items” ). Because Experiment 2 utilized abstract line-
drawings that minimize verbal processing, it was concluded that the results seen 
in Experiment 1 were not due to differences in the time required to generate 
names for “old” versus “new” items. 
II. Contrary to Experiments 1 and 2, Experiment 3 demonstrated that the AB was 
protracted when T1 was an “old item” as compared to a “new item.” This was 
accomplished by reversing the memory context originally seen in Experiments 1 
and 2. Based on this finding, it was concluded that it was not the newness of an 
item, but rather the memory uniqueness the item (an old item among new 
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distractors or a new item among old distractors) that significantly increased 
attentional dwell time as measured by an extended AB. 
III. Experiment 4 provided direct evidence that the effects of memory on attention 
observed here (an increased AB following memorial unique) was indeed driven 
by memorial context, and not by memorial priming between T1 and T2. 
 
In summary, Part 1 of this study provided new evidence for an aspect of attention that 
has not been well understood - the influence of item-memory on attentional allocation. Using 
the AB paradigm, we found that a T1 unique in memory-status (an old item among new 
distractors or a new item among old distractors) increased the duration of the AB. This effect 
was not dependent on the memory-status of T1 alone or on the relationship between T1 and 
T2, but was dependant on the memorial context (i.e., memory-status of surrounding 
distractors) (Parks & Hopfinger, 2008). One further consideration concerns whether the 
effect found here is specific to “memorial uniqueness,” or if it might apply to any general 
category difference, or in other words, any broad “uniqueness” unrelated to memory. 
However, the results of Part 1 (specifically, Experiment 4 of Part 1) in conjunction with 
another recent AB study suggest that the effect found here is indeed specific to memory. This 
study by Juola and colleagues (2004) parallels our current Experiment 4. While our stimuli 
varied in memory-status, those of Juola et al differed in their over-learned general categories 
(i.e., numbers and letters). Like our Experiment 4, the category of T1 was manipulated to be 
similar or different from the distractors, and the T2 category was always different from the 
distractors. Critically, their results found that the non-unique T1 led to an increased AB, 
whereas a unique T1 did not produce an AB (i.e., flat function across lags). Again, our study 
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found the opposite pattern: the unique T1 item produced an extended AB as compared to a 
non-unique item. Though these two studies were conducted for different purposes and 
utilized different timing, a comparison of these results suggests that the effects of memory 
(as seen in our experiments) seem to be distinct from those of general categories (as seen by 
Juola et al). In conclusion, our results provide a first step in establishing that item-memory 
uniqueness, determined through the interaction of item-memory strength and temporal 
memory context, plays a significant role in the temporal allocation of attention.  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 4 
PART 2: METHODS & RESULTS 
Part 1 used behavioral methods to examine the effects of memory and memory 
context on attention. However, little is known concerning the neural underpinnings of these 
effects. The goal of Part 2 was to investigate the neural effects of memory, and particularly 
memory context, on attention using a modified cuing paradigm. In Experiments 5 and 6, 25% 
of the pictures were “old”, and 75% were “new”. Thus, “old” items were unique relative to 
the ongoing context. This particular memory context (where old items were unique) was 
selected to promote maximal dissociation between the parietal old/new effect and the later 
memory context effects. 
First, a behavioral study (Experiment 5) was conducted to determine the optimal 
temporal range (specifically, the stimulus onset asynchrony between cues and targets) in 
which memory’s influence on attention was the largest. Once this time period was 
established, it was subsequently used (with modification, as will be discussed) in the cuing 
paradigm of Experiment 6, which additionally utilized event-related potentials. In this phase, 
a memorial context was established by centrally-located pictoral cues (i.e. memory context = 
new, when 75% of the cues are novel) as an unrelated attention task was performed in the 
periphery.  
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Experiment 5 
Participants  
 Eight undergraduate students (5 female and 3 male) from the University of North 
Carolina at Chapel Hill were recruited to participate. Each participant had 20/20 or corrected 
to 20/20 vision and was compensated with course credit.  
 
Materials & Procedure  
Before performing the experimental task, participants completed three blocks of 
“encoding” in which they made judgments about isolated objects. The stimuli no longer 
consisted of abstract line-drawings as in Experiments 2, 3, and 4 of Part 1 (AB studies), but 
rather consisted of black and white line-drawings of objects similar to those used in 
Experiment 1. In Experiments 2, 3, and 4, object stimuli were not used in order to remove 
any potential confound related to naming effects. However, these experiments found that 
naming effects were not driving the observed attentional effects. Because the possibility of 
naming effects was discounted, and because line-drawings of actual objects inherently lead to 
stronger memory traces, Experiment 5 (and 6) utilized pictorial object stimuli as opposed to 
abstract line-drawings. Specifically, picture stimuli were black and white line-drawings of 
common items extracted from various libraries, including 174 from the library of Snodgrass 
and Vanderwart (1980). Several other sources were utilized to supplement the Snodgrass and 
Vanderwart set, however, all were comparable in style and were normed for speed of picture-
naming (Szekely, D'Amico, Devescovi, Federmeier, Herron, Iyer,  Jacobsen, Arévalo, 
Vargha, & Bates, E., 2005). The full set of pictures included over 384 line-drawings, with an 
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average size of 8° x 8°. Target stimuli consisted of black and white, checkerboard patterned, 
vertically-oriented rectangles. 
In a sound attenuated room, participants viewed the stimuli on a 17-inch computer 
monitor. A commercial software package (“Presentation”; Neurobehavioral Systems; San 
Francisco, CA) was used to present stimuli and record responses. The stimuli were presented 
one at a time and in a random order, for 1000 msec each, separated by a 2000 msec 
interstimulus interval. Each encoding block required participants to make a different 
judgment about the pictures: (1) “Is the object heavy or light?” (2) “Does the object belong 
inside or outside?” (3) “Do you own the object?”.  Thirty-eight objects were studied in this 
way: thirty-two of which were used in the subsequent test phase of experiment (the same 
thirty-two for all subjects). 
After completing the encoding blocks, participants performed a continuous 
performance task (Please see figure below.). Participants were required to maintain fixation 
upon a centrally located cross throughout each block of trials. The background display 
consisted of a central fixation cross and two light gray square outline boxes, one located in 
the upper left visual field, and the other located in the upper right visual field. The non-
predictive cue stimulus consisted of a black and white line-drawing presented at the fixation 
cross, and its duration varied randomly between 250-450ms and 1350-1550ms, with no inter-
stimulus interval. The cue stimulus was either an “old” (previously studied) picture or a 
“new” (never before seen) picture. The ratio of old:new items presented was 0.33 (memory 
context = new). Targets appeared for 100ms, centered within one of the peripheral outline 
boxes. There were an equal number of targets in the left outline box and the right outline box. 
Again, all cue displays were non-predictive of upcoming targets. Participants were asked to 
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judge the side of the screen on which the target appeared (One button for left-hand side and 
another button for right-hand side). Participants were instructed to respond to the target as 
quickly as possible without sacrificing accuracy. (Note: originally a discrimination task was 
utilized in which participants had to judge whether a peripheral checkerboard was vertical or 
horizontal in orientation. However, pilot studies found no significant effects when this task 
was use; therefore, this task was replaced with a localization task.). Each participant 
completed a practice block, followed by 6 blocks of 64 trials each, for a total of 384 trials. 
Each block included a rest break at its midpoint. 
DESIGN: EXPERIMENT 5 
 
Results & Discussion 
Participants identified 98.4% of cues as having the correct memory-status (old 98.2%; 
new 98.5%), and 99.3% of targets as occurring at the correct location (targets following old 
cues: 99.3%; targets following new cues: 99.3%). A two-way ANOVA was performed on the 
accuracy to the targets with the factors of memory-status (target followed by an old cue or a 
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new cue) and visual field (left or right). The ANOVA revealed no significant main effect of 
memory-status [F(1,7)=0.005, p=0.944], and no significant effect of visual field 
[F(1,8)=0.451, p=0.523]. The interaction between memory-status and visual field did not 
approach significance [F(1,13)=0.020, p=0.892]. 
A two-way ANOVA was also performed on reaction times to the target with the 
factors of memory-status (targets followed by an old cue or a new cue) and SOA (250-450 or 
1350-1550). Only trials in which both the cue and the target task were correctly responded to 
were included in the analyses. The ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of memory-
status [targets following old cue: 361.3; targets following new cues: 368.1; F(1,7)=6.180, 
p=0.042], as participants responded to targets more quickly when they were preceded by old 
cues as compared to new cues (Figure 5). This suggests that attention was held less by old 
memorially unique items. In addition, there was also a significant main effect of SOA [SOA 
250-450: 371.2; SOA 1350-1550: 358.2; F(1,7)=6.908, p=0.034], as participants responded 
to targets more quickly when the cue-to-target SOA was longer. The interaction between 
memory-status and SOA did not approach significance [F(1,7)=0.026, p=0.878].  Because 
there was no interaction between memory and SOA, we chose to use both SOAs in a 
following pilot ERP experiment (mentioned above). However, this experiment (which did 
not include a cue task and is not included in this thesis) revealed few to none of the expected 
neural results. Upon inspection of the data, it appeared that the signal-to-noise ratio was not 
strong enough and that more trials would be needed to better interpret the data. In addition, 
we became concerned that the lack of a cue task may have led to the null effects found in this 
pilot experiment. Therefore, we chose to run a second ERP study (Experiment 6) using only 
one SOA; thus, doubling the number of trials in the experiment and increasing the signal-to-
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noise ratio.  Also, we added a cue task which forced participants to verbally state the 
memory-status of the memorial cue.   
 
FIGURE 5: Reaction Times to Targets (Experiment 5) 
 
 
 
After the cuing task, participants completed a recognition memory test for single 
objects (one-fourth new; one-fourth encountered in only the encoding phase; one-fourth 
encountered in the encoding and cuing phase; one-fourth encountered only during the cuing 
phase). Participants were asked whether or not they had studied the item during the encoding 
phase. Overall, participants correctly judged 100% of the studied items as “studied,” with no 
differences between items seen or not seen in the AB phase. [Studied Only: M=1.00 
(SD=0.000); Studied & used in cuing phase: M=1.000 (SD=0.000); t(7)=0.000, p=1.000]. In 
addition, participants were highly accurate on judging items that were new as “not studied” 
(M=96.296; SD=7.349). These results suggest that the studied items were indeed deeply 
encoded by the participants.    
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Experiment 6 
In Experiment 5 (and several pilot studies), participants were not required to respond 
to the memorial cue in any way, as we were interested in the automaticity of the effects of 
memory on attention. Following Experiment 5, we ran a pilot ERP experiment which was 
identical to the current Experiment 6, except that it did not include a memory cue task (and 
had one additional SOA range). This pilot experiment revealed no effects of memory on 
attention at the neural level. Therefore, the design for Experiment 6 was modified in two 
ways: (1) a task which required recognition of the memory-status of the cue was added, and 
(2) only one SOA range was used (1350-1550ms) to increase the signal-to-noise ratio. For 
further explanation, please see the Results section of Experiment 5. Before discussing the 
methodological details of Experiment 6, the predicted ERP effects to the memorial cues and 
the peripheral targets will be discussed below.  
 
Hypotheses: Early Visual Components 
Viewing the memorial cues will elicit early visual ERP components such as the P1 
and the N1; however, it is hypothesized that there will be no differences in the amplitudes 
and latencies between “old” cues and “new” cues, as no memory-related effects have been 
found at this level of processing (around 100ms post-stimulus onset) (i.e. Woodruff, Hayama, 
& Rugg, 2006).  
 
1) The Parietal old/new effect: As compared to new items, “old” items (that were deeply 
encoding during the study phase of the experiment) should produce a large positivity 
at parietal electrode sites around 500-800ms, replicating the parietal old/new effect. 
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The presence of this effect would provide evidence that successful recollection-driven 
recognition of these items had occurred during the cuing phase of the experiment. 
Behavioral measures should parallel this ERP result, finding that “old” items are 
correctly judged as being “previously studied” in an RKN memory test.     
 
2) The Early Context effect: As compared to new (memorially non-unique) items, old 
(memorially unique items) should produce a greater positivity around 800-1100ms, 
replicating the early context effect found by Herron and colleagues. This finding 
might suggest that participants successfully maintained or updated a representation of 
the structure of the list, or in other words, that some sort of neural processing of the 
memorial context occurred.  
 
3) The Late Context effect: As compared to new (memorially non-unique) items, old 
(memorially unique items) should produce a greater negativity around 1200-1600ms, 
replicating the late context effect also found by Herron and colleagues. Again, this 
would suggest that neural processing of the memorial context did take place. How (or 
if) this effect differs from the early context effect remains unclear. In the current 
paradigm, finding one context effect, but not the other (i.e. finding the early, but not 
the late; or the late, but not the early), may help to further differentiate the functions 
related to these ERP components.  
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Hypotheses: Predicted Behavioral & Neural Effects of Memory on Attention  
Please note: previous results have demonstrated that the amplitude of the N1 is not 
influenced by attention during localization tasks, but is during discrimination tasks (e.g., 
Mangun & Hillyard, 1991; Vogel & Luck, 2000). Because our paradigm utilized a 
localization task, we do not expect to find any attentional effects (as modulated by memory) 
on the N1, and thus, the N1 is not discussed below. 
 
1) Early Visual Processing (the P1): If memorially unique (in this case, old) items hold 
attention longer than the non-unique items (as was demonstrated in the AB studies), 
then there will be a decrement in behavioral performance in the target task. 
Specifically, reaction times to targets following memorially unique items, as 
compared to non-unique items, will increase. In other words, the increased hold of 
attention on the unique item will cause participants to respond slower to following 
targets. Because the task related to the target will be a simple localization (i.e. Did the 
target appear on the left or on the right side of the screen?), we do not expect to see 
any significant differences in accuracy between targets following old versus new 
items. At the neural level, the decrement in behavioral (reaction time) performance 
would be manifested as reductions in early visual processing of the target; specifically, 
decreased amplitudes in the P1 to targets preceded by memorially unique items as 
compared to targets preceded by new memorially non-unique items. Such a finding 
would suggest that memorial unique items hold attention at the same level as 
voluntary and involuntary attention (i.e. at the P1).  
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In contrast, if memorially unique items (“old” in this case) do not hold 
attention in this paradigm (as occurred in Experiment 5), then reaction times to targets 
following memorially unique items will decrease as compared to reaction times to 
targets following new memorially non-unique items. In other words, there will be an 
enhancement in behavioral target performance to targets following unique (“old”) 
items (as indexed by reaction time measurements, but not accuracy measurements). It 
is hypothesized that such a behavioral effect would be accompanied with an 
enhancement of neural target processing. More specifically, we would expect to find 
increased amplitudes in the P1 to targets preceded by unique items as compared to 
targets preceded by common items. This result would provide evidence against the 
notion that attention is being held on memorial unique items in this paradigm. Instead, 
it would suggest that attention is more quickly disengaged from memorially unique 
items.  
 
2) Later Context Updating (the P300): It remains unclear how memory’s effect on 
attention will be reflected in the P300 to targets because all of the targets were 
equally salient and probable, despite being temporally linked to cues of variable 
salience and probability. Whether the salience and probability of the cues will be 
linked to the following targets is unknown.  
 
Participants  
 Nineteen (9 females and 10 males) undergraduate students from the University of 
North Carolina at Chapel Hill were recruited to participate. Five participants were excluded 
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from data analysis due to excess movements, blinks, or other artifacts. Each participant was 
required to have 20/20 or corrected to 20/20 vision and no known neurological problems. 
Additionally, all participants were right handed. Each participant was paid $30.00 as 
compensation.  
 
Materials & Procedure  
Materials and procedures were identical to those used in Experiment 5, except that (1) 
participants also performed an old/new judgment on the cue item, and (2) the presentation 
timing of the stimuli was altered. In addition, ERPs were recorded as participants performed 
the test phase of the experiment. 
After completing the encoding blocks, participants performed a continuous 
performance task (Please see figure below.). Participants were required to maintain fixation 
upon a centrally located cross throughout each block of trials. The background display 
consisted of a central fixation cross and two light gray square outline boxes, one located in 
the upper left visual field, and the other located in the upper right visual field. The non-
predictive cue stimulus consisted of a black and white line-drawing presented at the fixation 
cross for 300ms. The cue stimulus was either an “old” (previously studied) picture or a 
“new” (never before seen) picture. The ratio of old:new items presented was 0.33 (old-unique 
condition). The stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA) between cue and target varied randomly 
between 1350-1550ms. Targets appeared for 100ms, centered within one of the peripheral 
outline boxes. There were an equal number of targets in the left outline box and the right 
outline box. All cue displays were non-predictive of upcoming targets. Participants were first 
asked to judge whether the central picture was old or new, and to hold their response until 
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further prompted. While remembering the memory-status of the cue, a peripheral target 
appeared, and participants judged the side of the screen on which the target appeared (One 
button for left-hand side and another button for right-hand side). Participants were instructed 
to respond to the target as quickly as possible without sacrificing accuracy. After responding 
to the target location, participants then responded as to whether the previous pictoral cue was 
“old” (previously studied) or “new” (never before seen). In contrast to the target task, the 
response to the cue was not speeded. Each participant completed a practice block, followed 
by 6 blocks of 64 trials each, for a total of 384 trials. Each block included a rest break at its 
midpoint.   
DESIGN: EXPERIMENT 6 
 
Recording & Analysis 
EEG was recorded through the Active-Two Biosemi system from 96 electrode sites, 
amplified at a bandpass of 0.01-100 Hz, and digitized at 256 samples per second. Eye 
movements were observed throughout all runs via a closed-circuit infrared video camera, and 
the electrooculogram was recorded by electrodes located beneath both eyes and lateral to the 
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outer canthus of each eye. All trials containing eye-movements or blinks were rejected off-
line and were not included in the analysis. Using the program Brain Electrical Source 
Imaging (BESA), EEG data was averaged to create ERPs, and the data was low-pass filtered 
to remove high frequency noise and high pass filtered with a single-pole causal filter to 
reduce low frequency drifts. The resulting ERP waveforms were then averaged across 
subjects referenced to the average signal from the electrodes located on the left and right 
mastoids. 
 
Behavioral Results: the memorial cues 
During the cuing phase of the experiment, participants identified 97.1% of cues as 
having the correct memory-status (old: 95.9%; new: 98.2%). In the recognition memory task 
after the cuing phase, participants correctly judged 98.2% of the studied items as “studied,” 
with no differences between items seen or not seen in the AB phase. [Studied Only: M=0.976 
(SD=6.052); Studied & used in cuing phase: M=.988 (SD=4.454); t(13)=-1.000, p=0.336]. In 
addition, participants were highly accurate on judging items that were new as “not studied” 
(M=92.857; SD=10.770). These results, along with the high accuracy seen in memory task 
during the cuing phase, suggest that the studied items were indeed deeply encoded by the 
participants.    
 
ERP Results: the memorial cues 
ERPs to the central memorial cue were examined for neural evidence of deep 
semantic encoding of the cue, and for memorial context updating of the cue within the test 
list. If participants deeply encoded the previously studied items (as was indicated by the 
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behavioral results), then the parietal old/new effect to these “old” items will be present. More 
specifically, the ERPs to previously studied items will be more positive than the ERPs to 
novel items beginning around 500ms in left parietal electrode sites. Further, if participants 
were updating the memorial context of the test item, as indexed by the early and late context 
effect, then ERPs to the memorially unique cue (in this case, “old” items) around 800-
1100ms should be more positive (the early context effect) and around 1100-1550ms should 
be more negative (the late context effect). No effects should be seen at the sensory ERP 
components of these cues (around 100-200ms), as memory has not been found to affect such 
early stages of visual processing.  
 Analyses were conducted on the mean voltage amplitudes of the parietal old/new 
effect (523-542ms) and the late context effect (1100-1300ms) evoked by the memorial cue 
using a repeated-measures ANOVA. No early context effect was found; and thus, no 
statistical analysis was performed between 800 and 1100ms. Factors included memory-status 
(old cue vs. new cue) and electrode.  
 
 The parietal old/new effect. Between 523 and 542ms after cue onset, a significant 
main effect of memory-status was found [F(1,13)= 500.970, p < 0.001], as the old cues had a 
significantly larger parietal old/new effect as compared to the new cues. This finding 
replicated the parietal old/new effect and demonstrates that the old items were indeed 
recognized as previously studied at the neural level. There were no main effects of electrode 
[F(2,26)= 2.895, p = 0.073] (Please see Figure 6 for the exact electrodes selected for 
analysis.).  
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FIGURE 6: ERPs to Memorial Cues, the parietal old/new 
effect
 
 
The late context effect. In addition, analysis at the later time range (1100-1300ms)  
provided evidence that memorial context was maintained or updated at the neural level, as 
there was a significant effect of memory at this time range [F(1,13)=15.681, p =0.002]. 
Specifically, memorially unique items (in this case, old items) evoked a significantly more 
negative waveform between 1100 and 1300ms after stimulus onset as compared to the non-
unique new items. There was also a significant effect of electrode, as the late context effect 
was stronger for left-central electrodes as compared to the central electrode [F(2,26)= 96.637, 
p <0.001] (Please see Figure 7 for the exact electrodes selected for analysis.). 
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FIGURE 7: ERPs to Memorial Cues, the late context effect 
 
 
Unlike the late context effect found by Herron and colleagues (which peaked at left 
prefrontal electrode sites), the late context effect found here peaked at central parietal 
electrodes sites, suggesting that the neural generator of this effect is relatively deep under the 
cortical surface or that some sort of coordinated neural activation is occurring during this 
effect. Additionally, a distinction was also found between the current result and those of 
Herron and colleagues. Specifically, the duration of the late context effect was decreased in 
the current experiment as compared to the effect found by Herron et al. This finding occurred 
in the time window in which the onset of the target stimulus occurred. Because the study by 
Herron et al did not contain any target stimuli, this may suggest that the presence of a target 
(or any other additional stimulus) may attenuate the late context effect. Further research 
manipulating the timing and presence of an interfering target is needed to confirm this 
hypothesis. 
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Discussion: the memorial cues 
 In summary, the analysis of the ERPs to the memorial cue suggests that the memory-
status of the cue (as indexed by the parietal old/new effect) and the memorial context of the 
item list (as indexed by the late context effect) were both processed at the neural level. While 
the parietal old/new effect found here was very much in line with previous descriptions of 
this ERP component, the late context effect found here was slightly different. For example, 
the duration of the late context effect here was decreased as compared to Herron et al’s effect, 
which suggests that the presence of the targets may have attenuated processing related to 
memorial context updating. In addition, it is currently unclear why no early context effect 
was found, but it is possible that its absence here was related to the presence of the peripheral 
target. Critically, the finding of a late context effect without an early context effect may 
suggest that these two components are sensitive to different cognitive functions or have 
different levels of susceptibility to interference. Further experiments manipulating the 
amount and timing of cue interference may help to dissociate the early and late context 
effects. 
 
Behavioral Results: the peripheral targets 
During the cuing phase of the experiment, participants identified 99.5% of targets as 
occurring at the correct location. A two-way ANOVA was performed on the accuracy to the 
target with the factors of memory-status (target followed by an old cue or a new cue) and 
visual field (left or right). The ANOVA revealed no significant main effect of memory-status 
[targets following old cue: 99.5%; targets following new cues: 99.5%; F(1,13)=0.788, 
p=0.391 ], and no significant effect of visual field [left: 99.7%; right: 99.4%; F(1,13)=0.000, 
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p=0.999]. The interaction between memory-status and visual field did not approach 
significance [F(1,13)=0.071, p=0.793]. 
A two-way ANOVA was performed on reaction times to the target with the factors of 
memory-status (targets followed by an old cue or a new cue) and visual field (left or right). 
Only trials in which both the cue and the target task were correctly responded to were 
included in the analyses. The ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of memory-status 
[targets following old cue: 363.336; targets following new cues: 384.578; F(1,13)=33.873, 
p<0.001], but there was no significant effect of visual field [left: 370.808; right: 377.106; 
F(1,13)=0.499, p=0.492]. The interaction between memory-status and visual field did not 
approach significance [F(1,13)=0.731, p=0.408]. Thus, like Experiment 5, participants 
responded faster to targets following old, memorial unique cues, regardless of the side on 
which the target appeared.  
Critically, these behavioral results suggest that attention was not held by the 
memorially unique items (“old” here) in this experiment, as the reaction times to targets 
following old memorially unique items was decreased as compared to reaction times to new 
memorially non-unique items. In other words, an enhancement in behavioral target 
performance to targets following old memorially unique items was found. (This finding was 
different from the findings of Part 1 of this thesis, which demonstrated that memorially 
unique items held attention as indexed by an extended. Why this difference might have 
occurred will be addressed later in the discussion.)  It was hypothesized that such a 
behavioral effect would be accompanied by an enhancement of neural target processing 
following old unique items, as evidenced by increased amplitudes in the P1 to these targets as 
compared to targets preceded by new memorially non-unique items. Based on previous 
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studies, we did not expect to see any effects on the N1 elicited by the targets. Lastly, it was 
unclear how memory’s effect on attention would be reflected in the P300 to targets as all of 
the targets were equally salient and probable, despite being temporally linked to cues of 
variable salience and probability. 
Before discussing the ERP results of Experiment 6, it is important to note that finding 
significant effects for reaction time measures does not necessarily suggest that significant 
effects will also be seen at the level of ERPs. Several studies have demonstrated dissociations 
between behavioral and ERP effects (Ries & Hopfinger, 2005; Hopfinger & West, 2006). For 
example, reaction time differences can be produced by multiple sources; and on the contrary, 
one ERP component can mask the effect of another ERP component, resulting in no apparent 
behavioral effect. In relation to the current study, the decrease in reaction time to targets 
following old memorially unique cues may or may not reflect changes with the 
corresponding ERP waveforms. However, investigations at the level of ERPs allows for a 
more clear understanding of the true mechanisms at work.  
 
ERP Results & Discussion: the peripheral targets 
ERPs to the peripheral targets were analyzed as a measure of attentional processing. 
In particular, we were interested in determining how the memory-status of the preceding cue 
would affect target processing. Analyses were conducted on the mean voltage amplitudes of 
the P1 (133-143ms) and the P300 (245-265ms) evoked by the peripheral targets using a 
repeated-measures ANOVA. Factors included memory-status (targets following an old cue 
vs. targets following a new cue), visual field (left vs. right), and electrode (P1: lateral vs. 
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more medial contralateral occipital locations; P300: anterior vs. posterior). Electrodes 
selected at the maxima of each ERP component can be seen in the Figures 9 and 10.   
 
P1. Between 133ms and 143ms after target onset, a significant main effect of 
memory-status was found [F(1,13)= 12.820, p = 0.003], as the targets following old cues had 
a significantly larger P1 as compared to the targets following new cues. This finding provides 
evidence that the attentional processing of targets was enhanced for targets following 
memorially unique old items as compared to targets following new memorially non-unique 
cues. In addition, a significant effect of visual field was found as the P1 was stronger for 
targets located on the left than for targets located on the right [F(1,13)=12.580, p = 0.004] 
(Figure 8).  
 
FIGURE 8: ERPs to Peripheral Targets, the P1 
  
 
 
 The P1 enhancement seen for some targets suggests that the memory items may act as 
orienting cues, which broadly shift attention to the upper visual field (where the targets are 
known to appear). When the target appears, attention is already shifted close to the possible 
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target locations; and thus, attention can affect target processing at an early stage of visual 
processing (i.e. the P1). If attention was not already shifted near the possible target locations 
(in other words, if the memory item was not an effective orienting cue), then attention would 
not be able to affect target processing at such an early stage of processing, as this processing 
would already be complete by the time attention was shifted to the target location. In 
summary, the increased disengagement of attention on old memorially unique items allowed 
attention to be more quickly allocated to possible target locations, which then led to early 
visual processing enhancements at the level of the target P1. If there was only one possible 
target location, then we would expect this P1 enhancement effect to be even larger as 
attention could be easily shifted to the appropriate target location. 
 
P300. Between 245 and 265ms post target onset, a significant main effect of memory-
status was found [F(1,13)= 10.611, p = 0.006], as targets following old cues had a 
significantly larger P300 as compared to the targets following new cues. In addition to the 
effect of memory-status, a significant effect of visual field was found as the P300 was 
stronger for targets on the left than for targets on the right [F(1,13)=20.033, p = 0.001]; 
however, no significant interaction was found between visual field and memory-status 
[F(2,26)=1.126, p = 0.288]. Lastly, there was no significant effect of electrode 
[F(2,26)=1.126, p = 0.340], nor an interaction between visual field, memory, and electrode 
[F(2,26)=0.448,  p = 0.644] (Figure 9). 
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FIGURE 9: ERPs to Peripheral Targets, the P300 
 
 
The above findings (in conjunction with the behavioral results) suggest that old 
memorially unique cues allow for a faster disengagement of attention (a decreased hold of 
attention), which then leads to an enhancement of early visual target processing (i.e. P1 
amplitude increases to target following old items). How this effect is related to the P300 
enhancement also seen for targets is unclear. Previous studies have found that the amplitude 
of the P300 is increased for items that are less probable and for items that are considered 
highly salient or ‘important’ to the task at hand (Donchin & Coles, 1988); however, the 
targets here were of equal probably (for left versus right locations) and of equal salience. 
There are two possible mechanisms, a direct and an indirect mechanism, which could be 
underlying the current ERP effect (increased P300 amplitudes for targets following old 
unique items). The direct mechanism suggests that each cue and target, being temporally 
close, become directly paired as one cognitive event. Although the targets are equally 
probable, the cue-target pairings are not. More specifically, targets following old cues are 
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more rare than targets following new cues (or in other words, an “old-cue-target” pairing is 
more rare than a “new-cue-target” pairing); and thus, the P300 is larger for these rare events 
in which targets are linked to a rare cue. While this hypothesis is possible, it seems less likely 
given that no P300 effect was found for the memorially unique (rare) cue. Another 
explanation lies in an indirect mechanism linking the cue and target. Again, recall that old 
memorially unique cues allowed for a faster disengagement of attention, which then led to an 
enhancement of early visual target processing (increased P1 amplitudes) to target following 
old cues. The fact that old memorially unique cues were more rare than the new memorially 
non-unique cues suggests that the P1 enhancement following these old unique cues was also 
a rare event. The rarity of this P1 enhancement could have led to an increased P300 
amplitude for these targets (specifically, targets following old memorially unique cues). To 
test this hypothesis, the physical salience of the targets (i.e. the actual brightness of the 
stimulus) could be manipulated, in essence, making a subset of the target items more rare 
based on increased enhanced visual processing (in this case, due to a physical characteristic 
rather than an attentional enhancement). If bright unique targets lead to an enhanced P300, 
then this indirect mechanism would be supported. However, if no P300 enhancement is seen, 
then the direct mechanism described above may be a more accurate explanation for the P300 
effect seen here.  
In summary, analysis of the ERPs to the peripheral targets suggests that memory 
significantly affects target processing at early (the P1) and late (the P300) stages of analysis. 
In other words, the effect of memory on attentional allocation is not limited to higher order 
stages of conflict, but also affects the earliest stages of processing typically found to be 
modulated by attention.  
  
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 5 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 
The goal of Part 2 was to investigate the neural effects of memory, and particularly 
memory context, on attention. This was accomplished through the use of ERPs, with a 
manipulation of a classic cuing paradigm. Specifically, the voluntary arrow cue typically 
used in this paradigm was replaced with pictures of items which varied in their memory-
status, referred to as “memorial cues”. We manipulated not only the memory-status of the 
cue, but also the memory context of the test list (in other words, the ratio of old:new items). 
By examining the ERPs to these memorial cues, we were able to determine the level at which 
these items were processed (i.e. whether they were deeply encoded and/or whether memorial 
context was processed). Critically, we were not only interested in the neural processing of 
cues, but also in the neural processing of targets following these cues. Of particular interest 
was how memory would affect target processing that is typically shown to be enhanced by 
attention (i.e. the P1 and the P300). The examination of target-evoked ERPs allowed us to 
determine if and how item-memory and memory context affect attention at the neural level. 
Importantly, we were interested not in the capture of attention by memory (as the onset of 
either old or new item can be distracting), but rather in the hold of attention (or in other 
words, the timing of disengagement), which may be affected differently by item-memory and 
memory context.  
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Again, although the primary goal of the current study was to investigate how memory 
affects the allocation of attention (through examination of the ERPs to the targets), it is 
imperative to first discuss the level of memorial processing which was attained by the 
memorial items (through examination of the ERPs to the cues). Distinct sets of memory-
related ERP components have been identified: one reflecting recollection-driven recognition 
(the parietal old/new effect) and two reflecting memorial context (components identified by 
Herron et al). Importantly, all of these components have been found in experimental 
paradigms using a slow presentation of individual test items. In contrast to these paradigms, 
the current paradigm used a faster presentation time for the memory cues, and additionally, 
the memory item was followed by a peripheral target (again, similar to a classic cuing 
paradigm). To our knowledge, no previous studies have investigated how memory 
components, such as the parietal old/new effect and the context effects, are influenced by the 
presence of an additional stimulus following a memory item.  
Our results replicated the parietal old/new effect, finding that “old”, memorially 
unique items (as compared to “new,” non-unique items) produced a large positivity at 
parietal electrode sites beginning around 500ms. The presence of this component provides 
evidence that successful recollection-driven recognition of these items had occurred during 
the cuing phase of the experiment (as was also evidenced by the recognition memory post 
test). In addition, the late context effect was also replicated, as old memorially unique items 
elicited a greater negativity beginning around 1100ms, suggesting that neural processing of 
the memorial context (more specifically, the maintaining or updating of the representation of 
the list structure) also took place. Though the late context effect was replicated, it is 
important to note that no early context effect was found, potentially suggesting that the 
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presence of the target interrupted some of the memory context updating. To fully elucidate 
the functional differences between the early and late context effects further research is 
needed. In summary, analysis of the ERPs to the memorial cue demonstrated that both 
recollection-driven recognition and some form of memorial context updating were processed 
at the neural level. 
While the findings related to cue processing were of interest, it was the neural 
processing of targets following these cues which allowed for the examination of the effects of 
memory on attention. This analysis provided new evidence that memory significantly affects 
target processing, as an enhancement in both behavioral and neural target processing was 
found for targets following memorially unique, old items as compared to memorially non-
unique, new items. Specifically, participants responded faster to targets following old 
memorially unique cues (as compared to new memorially non-unique cues), and importantly, 
this behavioral effect was accompanied with enhanced neural processing to these targets as 
indexed by increased P1 and P300 amplitudes (No effects on the N1 were found, which was 
expected as the N1 is not modulated by attention in localization tasks.). Again, this data 
provides new evidence that memory affects attention at the neural level. Given the direction 
of the behavioral results (decreased reaction times to targets following old, memorially 
unique items), the enhancement of target processing was expected. In other words, because 
attention was held less by the old memorially unique cues, increased attentional resources 
may have been allocated to the following targets. However, the direction of these findings 
was somewhat surprising based on the results of the AB studies in Part 1. Specifically, Part 1 
found that memorially unique items (whether old or new) held attention longer than 
memorially non-unique items as exhibited by an extended AB. However, Part 2 of this study 
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found that old memorially unique items did not hold attention in this paradigm, as reaction 
times to targets following old memorially unique items were decreased as compared to 
reaction times to new memorially non-unique items. Why this dissociation between Part 1 
and Part 2 was found is unclear and will be discussed below. However, before addressing this 
issue, it is first imperative to discuss what mechanism(s) may have been driving the effects 
demonstrated in Part 2.   
Again, Part 2 found that participants responded faster to targets following old 
memorially unique cues as compared to new memorially non-unique cues. Additionally, 
enhanced target processing (at the level of the P1 and the P300) was found for targets 
following old memorially unique cues. Currently, it remains unclear whether these results 
were driven by the “oldness” or the “memorial context” of the cues; thus, the attentional 
effects observed in target processing cannot be exclusively linked to either the parietal 
old/new effect or the late context effect elicited by the cues. In order to separate the effects of 
oldness from those of memorial context, the memorial context of Experiment 6 would need 
to be reversed, making “old” items the distractors instead of new items. Thus, “new” cues 
would now be unique relative to ongoing memory context, contrary to Experiment 6 where 
“old” items were unique. If the attentional effects observed in Experiment 6 were solely due 
to the memorial uniqueness of the cue, then the memorial context should reverse the target 
effect, and new items should now lead to decreased reaction times to the targets and 
enhanced attentional processing of these targets (Note: the parietal old/new effect would still 
be enhanced for the old items, but the late context effect would now be enhanced for new 
items.). Conversely, if the attentional effects were solely due to the “oldness” of the cues, 
then the memorial context should not matter, and old items should again lead to decreased 
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reaction times to the targets and enhanced neural processing of these targets. Whether such 
an effect of “oldness” is driven by differences in recognition processing times or differences 
in perceptual fluency would require further research. Additionally, if the effect here is driven 
by recognition (as might be implied by the presence of the parietal old/new effect), then 
further research would also be required to dissociate recollective-driven recognition (based 
on retrieval of contextual information) from familiarity-driven recognition (based on a sense 
of previous exposure without a contextual retrieval) (Yonelinas, 2002). Previous studies have 
shown that recollection and familiarity have qualitatively distinct neural systems (Yonelinas 
et al, 2001). While the “study phase” in all of the experiments described here was intended to 
create deep semantic encoding, and thus, to produce recollection-driven memory traces, it is 
likely that both recollective and familiarity memory traces were generated. Therefore, it 
remains unclear whether familiarity alone would influence attention in the same way as 
recollective-based memory. If the current effects are indeed found to be driven by oldness 
(and not memorial context), then an experimental manipulation of the level of processing 
during the study phase (i.e. deep semantic processing vs. shallow perceptual processing) may 
help dissociate the effects of recollection from those of familiarity on attention. In summary, 
without further experiments, it is difficult to determine if oldness (whether recollective or 
familiarity-based) or memorial context underlies the current effects.  
Despite the uncertainty regarding which quality of the memorial cues leads to the 
current effects, the primary goal of Part 2 was to investigate the neural mechanisms 
underlying the effects of item-memory and memory context on attention. In its design, the 
cuing paradigm used in Part 2 was intended to provide a measure of attentional hold (also 
known as attentional dwell time) through analysis of the reactions times to targets. If old 
59 
 
memorially unique items held attention longer than new memorially non-unique items (as 
would be predicted based on the AB results of Part 1), then a decrement in target behavioral 
performance following these old memorially unique items was expected. Conversely, if new 
memorially non-unique items held attention longer than the memorially unique old items (as 
would not be predicted based on the AB results of Part 1), then an enhancement in target 
behavioral performance following these old memorially unique items was expected. 
Ultimately, the latter effect was found, suggesting that attentional dwell time was decreased 
for old memorially unique items; and therefore, that attention was held less by these items. 
This conclusion is based on the notion that the effect seen here is due to differences in the 
hold of attention, as was demonstrated by the AB studies in Part 1. However, in Part 2, 
alternative explanations exist. First, memory’s effect on attention may not have been driven 
by differences in attentional hold, but rather by differences in general arousal levels to the 
memorial cues. Perhaps arousal to old memorially unique cues is increased as compared to 
arousal to new memorially non-unique cues. While this explanation is possible, it would be 
expected that arousal effects would cause enhancements at all levels of processing, including 
the N1 (Eason, Harter, and White, 1969). Because we found enhancements only at the P1 and 
P300, it is less likely that the effects found here are driven by changes in arousal level. 
Additionally, recent work by Olofsson and colleagues reviewed forty years of ERP studies 
which manipulated valence and arousal. They found that arousal effects (distinct from 
valence) occur after 200ms (Olofsson et al, 2008; Codispoti et al, 2007; Olofsson and Polich, 
2007); and thus, cannot explain the P1 effect (~100ms) found here. Again, this suggests that 
arousal is not causing the effects of memory on attention seen here. 
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Whatever the mechanism driving Part 2, it seems that this mechanism may be 
independent or different from that inherent in Part 1, as Part 1 found that memorially unique 
items (whether old or new) produced an increased attentional hold, while Part 2 found that 
old- memorially-non-unique items held attention. What underlies this difference remains 
unclear. Of particular note, however, is the disparity in the timing of stimuli used in Part 1 as 
compared to Part 2. In Part 1 (the AB), each stimulus was displayed for 176ms with an ISI of 
52ms, whereas each stimulus in Part 2 (the cuing paradigm) was displayed for 300ms with a 
large ISI ranging from 1050-1250ms. This difference in timing may have highlighted distinct 
levels of memorial processing from Part 1 to Part 2. In Part 1, the effect of memory on 
attention was found to be specific to memorial uniqueness and seemed to reflect an early 
automatic or unconscious updating of memorial context. For the purposes of this paper, this 
early automatic memorial context updating will now be referred to as “fast-context-
perception,” and will reflect the early intense focus of attentional resources which lead to an 
increased hold of attention on memorially unique items. Importantly, it is possible that the 
ERP effects found in Part 2 did not highlight this early fast-context-perception stage of 
processing, but instead, highlighted a later (potentially overlapping) stage driven not by 
automatic memorial context updating, but rather by an effortful “memory classification.” As 
the old items in Part 2 were also unique, this memory classification stage may reflect either 
the classification of an item’s individual memory-status (i.e. leading to a decreased hold on 
old items) or the memorial classification of an item as compared to the test list (i.e. leading to 
a decreased hold on memorially unique items). The memory-status recognition may parallel 
the parietal old/new ERP effect, and the memorial context updating may parallel the late 
context ERP effect. Whether driven by oldness or memorial context, the memory 
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classification stage appears to occur later in stimulus processing (as indexed by the onset of 
these ERPs) and to be more conscious in nature (as indexed by the need for a cue task).  
To contrast the “fast-context-perception” stage with the context updating inherent in 
the “memory classification” stage, it may be useful to relate the current findings to previous 
work in social cognition examining neural pathways to the amygdala. More specifically, 
when viewing fearful faces, a ‘fast-pathway’ for emotional processing is activated through 
direct connections from the lateral geniculate nucleus to the amygdala. This pathway is 
considered to be automatic in nature, in that it is activated even when emotional stimuli are 
not consciously perceived; and thus, may reflect an unconscious early warning system 
(Whalen et al, 1998). Additionally, a second indirect pathway to the amygdala (through 
visual processing areas) has been found to reflect a slower, conscious perception of 
emotional stimulus processing. These two stages of emotional processing, distinct in their 
level of automaticity, may provide an interesting parallel to the “fast-context-perception” 
stage and the context updating in the “memory classification” stage. Perhaps the fast-context-
perception is similar to the unconscious ‘fast-pathway’ to the amygdala in that it provides a 
first automatic pass of stimulus processing (i.e. “Does this item fit with the other items I’ve 
been viewing?”). In contrast, context updating of the memory classification stage may be 
similar to the effortful pathway to the amygdala which provides a conscious recognition of 
the memory context (i.e. “This item is old, but I have been seeing a lot of new items.”). In 
summary, like the processing of emotional stimuli, memory context updating may be divided 
into multiple stages which vary in their level of automaticity. However, before testing this 
hypothesis, it is first necessary to determine if memory context or memory-status is driving 
the memory classification stage. Critically, however, the current set of studies provides the 
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foundation necessary to determine the stimulus timing (i.e. the ISI between cues and targets) 
best suited to dissociate the stages of memorial processing. 
In conclusion, the current study provides new evidence for an aspect of attention that 
has not been well understood - the influence of memory on attentional allocation. Across four 
behavioral experiments, we examined the influence of item-memory on attentional dwell 
time by using a modified version of the AB paradigm (Part 1). Our results revealed that the 
AB was significantly affected by memory-status (novel versus old), but critically this effect 
depended on the ongoing memory context (Parks & Hopfinger, 2008). To examine the neural 
effects of memory and memory context on attention, we then recorded ERPs while subjects 
performed a modified cuing paradigm (Part 2). Our results provided new evidence that 
memory significantly affects target processing, and that this effect occurs at early (as indexed 
by the P1) and late (as indexed by the P300) stages of analysis. Specifically, targets 
following old memorially unique cues showed increased visual processing and faster reaction 
times compared to targets following new memorially non-unique cues. The results of Part 2, 
in conjunction with those of Part 1, suggest that the effect of memory on attention may 
critically depend on the neural level at which an item is being processed (whether at a fast-
context-perception stage or at a memory classification stage). Overall, these results provide 
the first evidence that memory affects attention at the neural level.  
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